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Notes from the Editorial Advisory Board
Janet E. Halley*
My classmates Jim Tourtelott, Joe Sommer, and Eva Saks invented
the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities at a Mexican restaurant
one night in the fall of 1987. When they announced their idea to me
the next day, my first thought was: "Great, now there can be a place
to publish the things I want to write." How greedy, and (to say the
same thing in a different way) how abject! My reaction reflects not a
sense of marginality or deviance (both of these always being tinged
with an adventurous self-confidence that was quite absent from my
attitude at that moment), but rather a sense of isolation. I could not
have had this bland reaction to the proposed oasis unless I had
accepted it as a given that my most urgent projects on the Law and
Humanities borderline were mine alone. But the idea of the Journal
swept through the law school and various graduate departments on a
wave of excitement. Clearly I had not been alone and would not be
able to imagine myself as isolated again.
The particular sociability of the Journal in its early days says
something important, I think, about the Law and Humanities project
more generally. The overt things are somewhat indicative. We strove
to introduce some of the virtues of humanities academic styles into
legal publishing. Law students and graduate students in the
humanities were equally credited members of the editorial team. We
decided to accept articles on the basis of peer review, to break the
invasive editorial habits inculcated by the standard law reviews in
favor of respecting our contributors as responsible authors, and to flip
the standard law reviews' emphasis on citation over analysis.
Rejecting a humanities trend toward coterie journals, we decided to
keep the Journal open to every approach to Law and Humanities
work and every political sensibility (and thus not to adopt a title like
the Yale Journal of Law & Literature or the Yale Journal of Law &
Culture).1 Some of the things we did were not inflected by either
* Professor of Law and Robert E. Paradise Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law School.
1. These decisions were all unequivocally good ones, though I am not sure how many of
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academic point of origin. We kicked off the Journal with a panel at
the Modern Language Association meeting in New Orleans convening
Jeff Nunokawa, Carol Rose, and Patricia Williams to discuss new
approaches to property. We disagreed, angrily sometimes, about
whether the work of this or that scholar in our chosen domain was
fabulous or tedious. We had amazing parties.
A more subtle, but more important part of the early life of the
Journal was the strange chemistry between law students and graduate
students. Law students specialize in nothing, decide what to study with
almost no interference from their faculty (a virtually riskless ar-
rangement because their real choices are so narrow), and don't really
know where they want to end up working. Graduate students are
writing something big and specialized, are mentored and supervised
sometimes to the point of domination (possibly because the choices
across which they are being professionalized are amazingly broad),
and know exactly the kind of job they want. Graduate students rarely
work together on anything, almost never think of themselves as
problem-solvers, and are apt to say "the law" as if it were a thing you
could be inside or outside of. Law students are irretrievably
gregarious, love to show off their ability to get things done, and (at
Yale at least) have a million ways of problematizing, particularizing,
and historicizing "the law."
I have taught several interdisciplinary seminars at Stanford Law
School and have noticed that these differences can produce the most
exhilarating shifts in readability if things go well, and the most
narcissistic, self-protective scrambles for turf and authority if they
don't. Things went well in the first months of the Journal's life.
Repeatedly the editors approached the differences between them with
respect, curiosity, deference, and a hope that some of the virtues
might be catching. Every time we did so, the euphoria that became
characteristic of the Journal was renewed.
I graduated from law school before the Journal published a single
line. My group solicited the first issue, but continuing students saw the
first manuscripts into print. Looking back, I think that the extraor-
dinary social moment that set the Journal in motion requires some
explanation. First, why was it so unexpectedly capacitating for so
many people? And second, why was it so euphoric? What does the
sociability of those first months of the Journal suggest about the Law
and Humanities project today?
them have been consistently workable. We probably made some bad decisions too; I forget what
they were, though I am sure editors after the inaugural year can identify them precisely.
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First, it appears that the constituency of the Journal-amorphous,
to be sure, but populous-was dispersed, impassioned, and already in
place. Like the explosively well-attended conference sponsored by the
"Working Group on Law, Culture, and the Humanities" at George-
town Law School this spring, the Journal's birth revealed that an
unexpectedly large number of legal scholars had already decided that
they could not do what they needed to do using that would-be legal-
academic hegemon, law and economics. The remarkable interest
sparked by the Journal and the Georgetown conference on the
humanities side of the fence is a similar indication that an un-
foreseeably large number of scholars there have already decided that
they cannot pursue their distinctive disciplinary undertakings without
coming to grips with "the law," not as a reified Sublime Command,
but as a dazzlingly complex array of social, cultural, linguistic, and
normative practices.
Second, it appears that the Law and Humanities project holds out
the promise of undoing a division induced by an academic structure
that splits law schools off from their universities as quasi-autonomous
professional schools. This division makes people miserable, I think,
because it underwrites a theory/practice distinction that is both
mistaken and intensely destructive. In the name of this distinction,
humanities scholars disdain practical problems and the normative
agon of working within currently binding constraints. In its name,
legal scholars sneer at scholarly inquiries that take arcane training to
pursue and that produce writing that is "hard to read." The first
months of the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities were ex-
hilarating, I think, precisely to the extent that the editors simply
suspended these poisonous interactions.
Those early editors opened the door to scholarship that keeps
theory and practice simultaneously in play. The Journal has published
this work consistently over its first decade, and I am certain it has
"incentivized"-that is, emboldened people to write-important work
that other publications have actually printed. At its best, this work is
both socially, historically, institutionally, and normatively entangled
and intellectually self-conscious, skeptical, speculative, and
exploratory. The door stands open, and I am thankful to ten years of
editors for continuing to hold it ajar.
1998]
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Hendrik Hartog*
It is almost exactly ten years since I was called and asked if I had
any work I wanted to submit for possible publication in a new journal.
By odd coincidence I did, and seven months later Mrs. Packard on
Dependency appeared in Volume 1, Issue 1.1 The editors with whom
I spoke claimed they were not regular-law-review editor types. They
promised a light and respectful editing. And they kept their word. I
remember only one cut on which they insisted. I had described
Elizabeth Packard as an "Indianapolis" of nineteenth-century legal
culture, by which I meant to place her as a "site" of importance only
for the roads (of thought and practice and identity) that flowed
through her. But I think one of the editors was from Indianapolis and
thought the characterization a bit disrespectful (of Indianapolis, not
of Elizabeth Packard).
Now, a new generation of editors wants me to wax weighty on the
meaning of the past decade. And again I am compliant. But I don't
have a clue where to begin. What does it signify that the Yale Journal
of Law & the Humanities has come so quickly to play such a large
place in the little world of scholarship that I inhabit? What explains
the Journal's emergence: Our hunger? (The "our" of course refers to
those of us who self-identify as Law and Humanities types.) The
genius of successive editors? (Of course.) Or is it just one more
example of the colonizing power of core institutions of American legal
education? Perhaps we should understand this legal-humanistic
enterprise as akin to a third-rate colony of the British raj: important
not for material reasons (not India in other words), but to maintain
the impression that the sun never sets on the British Empire.
It does seem to me that something interesting has happened over
the past twenty years or so to the self-consciousness of those of us
committed to the Law and Humanities project. Not important, maybe,
because nothing about us ever is that, but interesting nonetheless.
And the success of the Yale Journal, as well as the meeting in
Washington, D.C. in March of this year of the first annual conference
on Law, Culture, and the Humanities, may demarcate dimensions of
that change.
That is, once upon a time, to be us meant to know ourselves as
sociologically marginal. There was a core. There was a periphery. We
* Class of 1921 Bicentennial Professor of the History of American Law and Liberty,
Princeton University.
1. Hendrik Hartog, Mrs. Packard on Dependency, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79 (1988).
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were part of the second, never the first. The point is not modesty. In
our dark moments, when we wrestled with our grandiosity, we
imagined that what we did was of earth-shaking importance. Those of
us who were legal historians, for example, knew that Maitland and
Hurst and E.P Thompson (and and and) had set for us models of
imagination and grandeur that revealed the triviality of the puffed-up
claims, the petty enterprise, of those who inhabited the core of
academic law. But we also knew, knew deeply, knew as a fundamental
core of our being, that those at the core, in the metropole, would
never know their own emptiness and that we would never be taken
seriously. By them. Who were never us. They might patronize us, by
hiring us, for reasons that had to do with a residual need to appear
academically respectable within a university. But they would never
understand what we did. Or, so we believed. They had their way of
being, and of knowing law; we had ours. Theirs was coherent,
effective, boring, and powerful. Ours was tentative, exploratory, and
powerless. But also fun. In our separateness, we might establish
community (I went to my first legal history conference to discover the
odd but shared pleasures of marginality), but it was always a deviant
community.
And there was lots of evidence out there to confirm us in our
commitment to our marginality. One example only: In 1976 1 went to
the law-teaching recruiting convention. At every law school interview
but one, some well-intentioned faculty member asked, with genuine
confusion and friendliness: Why would you want to teach something
like legal history?
But the point is not that we were right. The point is that our beliefs
were constitutive of who we were: the other, not them. When we
entered their space, we did so adopting a variety of stances that
affirmed our separate identities. I know I thought of myself as a
missionary at various times, as a counter-irritant, as a presence that
might provide protection (cover) for those few students who might
wish to know themselves as "us." But there were more moments
when I struggled with myself about who I was. Was I what I was (not
them) only because I was inadequate, unable to achieve a core
identity? Not smart enough, lacking in cleverness, missing something?
Much has happened. Much has changed. The ordinary methods of
law study, the techniques of the core, today include chunks of
economics and history and political theory and literary analysis, not
to mention feminist theory and critical race theory. It may be, as a
result, that the core ain't what it used to be, that the core has lost
some disciplinary power. Perhaps, though I remain skeptical. But for
my purposes here, the more important point is that we, whoever "we"
are, no longer have an identity defined by our antinomic relationship
1998]
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with the core of legal study. Everyone is fascinated by law today
(including lots of humanistic scholars who have never entered a law
school), and disciplinary barriers no longer work the way they once
did. There are now people throughout the university who want to talk
with us, work with us, play with us. We still have a deep commitment
to our marginality. But it is now a marginality indistinguishable from
the marginality that is the common lot, the ordinary experience, of
academics and scholars. It is no longer what it once was.
And that raises for me a final set of questions. That is, without that
sense of core and periphery, of power and powerlessness, of bad and
good, can we construct a sense of community for ourselves? Can we
know ourselves as engaged in a common pursuit? Or are we today
just a bunch of individuals located in a variety of academic settings,
all of whom have wildly varying interests in an unsettled and
undomesticated subject called the law (a subject traditional law study
long struggled to contain)? Is our only source of collective identity the
happenstance that all of us might conceivably write something that
might appear in the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities?
6
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Richard Weisberg'
I am pleased indeed to participate in this tenth anniversary issue.
The field of Law and the Humanities-and, more specifically, Law
and Literature-continues to produce remarkable work. Some of that
work appears in this Journal on a regular basis; some appears in Car-
dozo Studies in Law and Literature, which also celebrates its tenth
birthday this year. (In yet another tenth anniversary event, the second
edition of his Law and Literature, Judge Richard Posner graciously
salutes the vibrancy and endurance of these two journals,1 while then
replicating his unconvincing and especially unliterary attacks on the
field more generally.)
In the brief time and space allotted me for remarks here, I wish to
flag only one change in Law and Literature notions during these ten
years. I believe that the false dichotomy between "theory" and
"text"-sometimes stated as between law-as- and law-in-
literature-has, fortunately, broken down. The narrative has been
revealed as the source of the theory. We are reading stories now or
at least thinking of the ways stories are told; we are less interested in
name-dropping and in making sure that the Law and Literature
enterprise has the mark of the latest French theoretician.
I am serious in naming a hypothetical national origin for this
theoretician because I believe that there is abroad in the land a post-
postmodernism, one that has become skeptical of the absurd
nonreferentiality and obscurantist jargon of some postmodernist
thinkers, however marvelous and funny may otherwise be their
approach to language. The focal move is toward the specificity of his-
tory, and the most talked-about event (hitherto avoided by both the
methods and the aims of most postmodernists) is the Holocaust. In a
newly emerging discourse, partly originated by Law and Literature
thinkers2 and by storytellers like Camus and filmmakers like Alain
Resnais and Louis Malle, the sad events of Vichy France have been
foregrounded. The Vichy model, unlike that of the Third Reich, to
which admirable postmodernists like Geoffrey Hartman had previous-
ly directed their concern, indicates that complexity of discourse and
a kind of deconstructive flexibility with the egalitarian metanarrative
* Walter Floersheimer Professor of Constitutional Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law.
1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITFERATURE at vii (rev. ed. 1998).
2. See, e.g., GEOFFREY HARTMAN, THE LONGEST SHADOW 73-74 (1996) (referring to
RICHARD WEISBERG, Legal Rhetoric Under Stress: The Example of Vichy, in POETHICS, AND
OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 143 (1992) [hereinafter POETHICS]).
19981
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of French constitutionalism contributed more than did simplistic or
idealistic rhetoric to the doing of evil during the Holocaust. Stories,
it might be said, particularly Camus's The Fall,3 laid down a more
appropriate postmodernist strategy of speaking and reading than we
find, say, in Derrida.
Our discourse, to put it simply, is becoming more historical, more
specific, more ethical. Law and Literature is a "naming" interdis-
cipline, not one largely designed to reify the everywhere otherwise
situated discourse of antifoundationalism. Yet the stakes for our
culture and our beliefs are far greater than have been apparent in the
postmodernist turn. And this is because an emphasis on text rather
than theory-on naming rather than unnaming-coerces choices.
What kind of law do we want, and based on what kinds of values?
What lessons, some of them potentially specific, will we learn from
the sad event that marks the end-Camus's Fall-of the ensconced
narratives of European culture? To what alternative models might we
now turn?
Law and Literature, partly through an empirically demonstrable
move in the recent year or two to religion, will be the primary force
in formulating a discussion of these millennial issues. (Perhaps this is
why I understood him-where perhaps in the past I have not 4-when
James Boyd White recently agreed to write "about religion" even
though he was hardly an expert on it-who is?-and admitted "the
enormous difficulty of talking about religion in the language of the
law."' ) Here again, stories, not all of them Biblical, will anticipate
theory.
For me, the question will be a hermeneutic one: Which value
system or systems will likely lead to just ways of reading and doing
the law, and which ones will not? My sources will be not only the
narratives of the tragic history of what has passed for law during our
century in places like Vichy, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and
South Africa, among other places; but also the marvelous iconoclasm
of Nietzsche and the brilliant postwar accounts of Giinter Grass. But
these are my sources. Law and Literature eschews enforcing simple
answers or directed bibliographies on its practitioners.
It is freedom within such a challenging and aspirational structure of
discourse that keeps Law and Literature alive and well. May this
3. ALBERT CAMus, THE FALL (Justin O'Brien trans., Vintage Books 1956) (1956).
4. See RICHARD WEISBERG, Notes on Three Works by James Boyd White, in POETHICS,
supra note 2, at 224.
5. James Boyd White, Talking About Religion in the Language of the Law: Impossible but
Necessary, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 177, 177 (1998).
396
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Journal continue to play a key role in the growth of our still-fledgling
but demonstrably precious organism.
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James Boyd White*
The tenth anniversary of this Journal is an occasion not only for
celebrating its remarkable achievements, but also for thinking again
about the nature and premises of the work it reflects. One way to
begin might be with its two central terms, "law" and "humanities" (or
the obvious alternative to the second, "literature").
"Law" is a term we lawyers think we understand clearly enough,
but those who are not trained as we are puzzle a good deal over the
word, and not without reason. Does it mean a set of rules, a set of
authoritative texts, certain modes of interpretation, a forum for the
resolution of conflicts, a way of carrying on disputes, a set of
techniques of argument or analysis, a cluster of institutions in the
world, the instrument for the expression of political power, or what?
The law is all of the above and more, we say: At its center, it is a set
of intellectual and social practices, defined and taught by a community
of lawyers, professors, and judges. It is in this sense like a language.
And these practices, like those of any language, are in the process of
their own revision, which means that what the lawyer learns is not
only certain modes of thought and expression, but ways of plying
them to particular situations, appropriating them to his or her own
mind, and in the process transforming them. This is what we teach
and what we learn; it is because it is so complex and uncertain, so
alive and full of surprise, that law is so interesting, and it is for the
same reason that it has the power, endurance, and value that it does
as a social and ethical institution.
When I studied law, perhaps more than is the case now, legal
practices were seen as discrete, with an ethical and aesthetic sig-
nificance of their own. The law was not "autonomous," in the sense
of existing independently from every other cultural form, but it did
have a distinctive identity and role, and we knew it could not simply
be collapsed into other forces, genres, or practices. As an activity that
transforms the material of life into another form, with a different kind
of meaning, it has the essential characteristics of an art.
How about "humanities" or "literature"? I will begin with the
second and perhaps more modest term, which presents difficulties
comparable to "law." The main danger of "literature" is that it seems
to invoke a canon of high literature embodying a certain set of old-
fashioned social and political views. But thinking of my own ex-
* L. Hart Wright Professor of Law, Professor of English, and Adjunct Professor of Classical
Studies, University of Michigan.
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perience when I was working on The Legal Imagination1 more than
twenty-five years ago, I did not think of the literature I invoked as a
fixed set of texts, and certainly not one that taught a certain morality
or politics. For me "literature" was really a set of questions, learned
partly from my reading, partly from my teachers, questions one could
bring to virtually any text. Some texts rewarded this kind of attention
wonderfully, others much less so; the former were "literary," but the
difference was not much related to whether the particular text had
been "canonized." The questions that the word "literature" defined
were practices, in this a bit like law; and their true object was not a
set of sacred objects, but life itself: the world of language and
expression and meaning in which we constantly live.
What I think of as literary questions were of two general sorts,
which I will call "ethical" and "intellectual." The first begins with the
speaker: Who is speaking here, in what dramatic situation, in what
tones of voice, to whom, and with what effect? Is this an admirable
definition of self and other, one that the reader might wish to imitate
or appropriate, or not? This kind of reading is a training of the ear,
and its most important application is not to one's reading, but to one's
own writing: Who am I here, using what tones of voice, speaking to
whom, and with what effect? There are lots of negative possibilities
against which to be on guard, and it is difficult to define positive ones.
The second set of questions has to do with the language used, its
force and implication, and the kind of relation the speaker establishes
with it. Do you simply replicate your forms of speech, speaking just
as others do, or do you find a way to make them your own, and if so,
do you do so in a good or a bad way? What are the forms or genres
with which you work, and what are their significances? How do you
give meaning to your terms, as they are used relative to each other?
Here language becomes continuous with culture and the question
arises how far one's mind is made by its inheritance; how far-and
how-it can remake it.
Speaking of my own experience, then, when I turned to
"literature," it was not to a public Western canon, but to a set of
questions, a set of practices, which could be brought to any text.
Hence the appearance, in my early book, of passages from Emily
Post, Prison Rules, Fowler's Modern English Usage, and so on. And
in my view, the most important texts to which these questions were
to be brought were those produced by the student, and by me, in class
1. JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL
THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (1973).
1998]
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and in the rest of life. "Literature" is in the end not a matter of high
culture, but of a certain kind of attention to human expressions.
"Humanities" is obviously a much broader term than "literature,"
and presents a different danger: that it will invoke a set of established
disciplines, such as art history, classics, philosophy, music, architecture,
and so on; and all as if they were entities that the law could somehow
incorporate or in some unproblematic way learn from. There is a
related risk that one will think that the academic fields are more real
or important than the painting or architecture or music itself; the
method more important than the material of study. Actually, the
lawyer can and should direct attention both to the primary works of
expression and to the ways of reading them that characterize different
disciplines. With respect to the latter, the task is to establish relations
between distinctive communities of discourse; with respect to the
former, it is to find a way to talk about works whose expressive action
has already been completed. As I have elsewhere argued, both tasks
present a problem of translation, in facing which one must address the
differences, in some sense unbridgeable differences, between
languages, between forms of expression, and between cultures and
selves.
On the other hand, there are unifying questions or themes running
through the primary works and the disciplines too. Though I know
this is a contested position, for me the key element that unites the
humanities-it is at work in a pronounced way in "literature "-is a
shared interest in meaning: the meaning of what we say, the meaning
of our languages and what we do with them, the meaning of the
relations we establish with each other through language. Of course we
live in a material universe, but it is not self-interpreting or self-
signifying, and neither is our social world. The question at the center
of the humanities, then, is what this artifact or that-this poem or
temple or sonata or novel or ritual or linguistic pattern-should be
taken to mean. This is also the central question of law, beyond the
immediate issue of rule or result: What does it mean that this
happened, or that, or that we decide the case this way or that? That
is the deepest question for the judge, and for the lawyer too, for it is
at the center of his argument: "If you decide this way it will mean
In both the law and the humanities we are constantly asking
questions of meaning, yet without knowing fully what we are doing
when we do so. It is with this question-what we are doing when we
ask questions of meaning-that our future work might best concern
itself, both in our writing and in our teaching.
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